Manning the gates: migration policy in the Great Recession by Mike Nicholson & Pia Orrenius
Insights from the 
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS
EconomicLetter
VOL. 5,  NO. 5
JUNE 2010   
During the downturn, 
advanced economies 
as well as developing 
countries adopted 
policies ranging from 
keeping new migrants 
out to encouraging 
resident migrants 
to leave.
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by Mike Nicholson and Pia Orrenius
The Great Recession of 2008–09 brought steep declines in world out-
put, employment and trade—all told, the worst falloff of global economic activ-
ity since the Great Depression. During the downturn, advanced economies from 
Australia and Western Europe to developing countries such as Thailand and Ka-
zakhstan adopted policies ranging from keeping new migrants out to encourag-
ing resident migrants to leave. 
The  most  common  policy  changes  included  tightening  numerical 
limits or imposing categorical limits on immigrant inflows, paring back lists 
of shortage occupations and changing eligible occupations for temporary mi-
grants. 
Nations also limited the opportunities for migrants to adjust their le-
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requirements, or labor market tests, to 
give native-born workers an edge over 
their  foreign-born  competitors.  Many 
countries also boosted immigration en-
forcement, stepping up efforts to round 
up unauthorized immigrants and pros-
ecute their employers. 
Through these initiatives, lawmak-
ers sought to help domestic workers by 
limiting foreign competition during a 
severe economic downturn. While the 
intent of these measures is clear, their 
bite is somewhat uncertain. Recessions 
diminish employment opportunities, 
so cross-border labor flows decline on 
their own accord, reducing competition 
for jobs from foreigners.
In fact, the immigration backlash 
could have its greatest effect after 
the recession ends, when a growing 
demand for labor could run headlong 
into labor market restrictions that 
remain in place. These could impede 
countries’ ability to recruit workers in 
sectors vital to their recovery and long-
run economic growth.
From Economic Boom to Bust 
In the years leading up to the 
Great Recession, economic expan-
sion and housing booms in countries 
such as Spain, Italy and Ireland led to 
unprecedented levels of immigration 
and transformed what had tradition-
ally been sending countries into prime 
destinations for migrants from within 
the European Union (EU) and around 
the world.1 
From 2000 to 2007, Spain was 
Europe’s leading destination for 
migrants by a large margin. Immigrant 
inflows averaged 642,000 per year, and 
the number of foreigners rose from 
less than 1 million to nearly 5 mil-
lion. The foreign share of the Spanish 
population rose from 2 percent to 10.4 
percent over this period.
Italian immigration also skyrock-
eted, with flows averaging 338,000 
newcomers a year between 2000 and 
2007, up from only about 50,000 in the 
late 1990s. The foreign share of Italy’s 
population more than doubled, rising 
from 2.2 to 5 percent. 
did not accelerate in the 2000s. Green 
card issuances averaged about 1 mil-
lion per year, the same as in the 1990s, 
and the foreign-born population share 
rose modestly from 11.1 percent in 
2000 to 12.5 percent in 2008, a slower 
rate of increase than in the prior 
decade. 
The expansion that spurred immi-
gration throughout much of Europe 
came to an abrupt end with the 
2008 financial crisis and slowdown 
in world economic growth. The next 
year, world output contracted 0.6 per-
cent, and the volume of global trade 
declined 10.7 percent.3 Unemployment 
rates skyrocketed in many countries, 
particularly in those that had experi-
enced housing booms, such as Spain, 
the U.S., the U.K. and Ireland (Chart 
1). 
Between December 2007 and 
December 2009, unemployment rates 
rose from 5 percent to 10 percent in 
the U.S., from 8.8 percent to 19 per-
cent in Spain and from 4.8 percent to 
13 percent in Ireland. The EU area as 
a whole experienced a milder rise in 
Annual inflows to Ireland rose 
sharply during this time as well—from 
42,000 in 2000 to 89,000 in 2007. 
The foreign share of the population 
increased from 3.3 to 10.5 percent. 
Ireland was among the three EU coun-
tries to allow migration from the eight 
Eastern and Central European nations 
that joined the bloc in 2004, often 
referred to as the “accession eight,” 
or A8.2 Irish immigrants came mostly 
from Poland. Ireland also took in a 
significant number of immigrants from 
countries outside the EU, including the 
U.S., India and China.  
U.K. migration also rose in the 
period leading up to the recession, 
albeit to a lesser extent since the U.K. 
has long been a country of immigra-
tion. Inflows increased from 364,000 in 
2000 to 527,000 in 2007. The foreign 
share of the population edged up from 
4.5 percent in 2001 to 6 percent in 
2007. As in the case of Ireland, many 
of these new immigrants came from 
the A8 countries.
In contrast to the new destination 
countries of Europe, U.S. immigration 
Chart 1
Unemployment Rates Rise During the Great Recession in 
Many Popular Destination Countries
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unemployment—from 6.9 percent to 
9.4 percent.
Migration Policy Responses
The Great Recession caused great 
anxiety. Many governments, including 
in the U.S., passed stimulus packages 
aimed at promoting consumption and 
job growth through tax rebates, infra-
structure projects and expanded social 
benefits. In addition, governments 
sought to help individuals directly 
with job-creation programs and by 
extending assistance to unemployed 
workers.
Countries also adopted protec-
tionist trade and immigration policies. 
Protectionist trade policies often back-
fire when trading partners respond 
with similar measures. Restrictive 
immigration policies are typically not 
subject to the same tit for tat as trade, 
but reduced migration hurts migrants 
and poor sending countries, which 
often rely on remittances. Measures 
targeting resident migrants can slow 
their economic progress and hamper 
integration.
Countries responded to rising 
unemployment rates with policies 
designed to limit foreign-born work-
ers’ access to labor markets. Table 1 
summarizes major policy changes in 
countries around the world from 2008 
to the present. 
In the U.S., the Troubled Asset 
Relief Program (TARP), implemented 
in 2008, discouraged banks and 
financial institutions receiving fed-
eral bailout funds from hiring foreign 
workers through the H-1B program 
for high-skilled specialty workers. In 
February 2010, an executive order 
imposed stricter rules for employers 
using foreign-born farmworkers.4 Since 
May 2009, U.S. rules also require that 
government contractors run all new 
employees through E-Verify, a feder-
ally operated electronic program that 
checks for valid Social Security num-
bers that match workers’ names.5 
Measures aiming to protect native 
workers were also taken in other 
countries hit hard by the recession—
notably Ireland, Spain and the U.K. 
The most frequent policy approach 
emphasized controlling worker inflows 
from outside the EU. 
In 2009, Ireland stopped issuing 
work permits to foreigners for low-
paid occupations in addition to house-
hold workers and truck drivers. Spain 
restricted the recruitment of certain 
categories of guest workers in 2008 
and 2009.6 
The U.K. upped salary and edu-
cation requirements for high-skilled 
workers from outside the EU and sus-
pended recruitment of low-skilled non-
EU workers in 2009. Salary require-
ments were tightened further in early 
2010.7 
Like the U.S., these countries also 
adopted a number of policies target-
ing employers. Ireland extended its 
labor market tests, requiring prospec-
tive employers to advertise jobs for 
eight weeks within the EU prior to 
seeking workers from outside the 
bloc. Furthermore, individuals renew-
ing work permits are now subject 
to labor market tests that weren’t in 
force before the crisis.8 The U.K. also 
doubled the job advertising period for 
employers seeking certain categories 
of skilled workers from outside the 
EU. And Spain curtailed labor market 
test exemptions for skilled “shortage” 
workers.9
These countries also adopted a 
variety of measures directed toward 
foreigners residing within their bor-
ders, legally and illegally. Ireland tight-
ened requirements for work permit 
renewals and stands by naturalization 
prerequisites, which result in rejec-
tion of nearly half the applicants for 
Irish citizenship.10 The U.K. Parliament 
voted in July 2009 to toughen citizen-
ship requirements for status adjusters, 
effective in 2011.11
Seeking to curtail illegal immigra-
tion, Ireland passed new measures 
limiting unauthorized migrants’ access 
to public services, and the U.K. raised 
fines for employers of unauthorized 
migrants.12 A number of other coun-
tries have also stepped up immigration 
Countries responded to  
rising unemployment  
rates with policies 
designed to limit 
foreign-born workers’  
access to labor 
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enforcement. Italy has criminalized 
unlawful presence, authorized citizen 
patrols to combat illegal migration and 
barred illegal migrants’ access to public 
services.13 France has launched several 
high profile raids, and Greek police 
drew international attention when 
they bulldozed a migrant camp near 
the city of Patras. Israel created a new 
task force to combat illegal migration. 
A number of popular destinations for 
Asian migrants, notably Malaysia and 
Singapore, have cracked down on ille-
gal migration as well.
Perhaps the most innovative 
policies entailed creating incentives 
for foreign workers to return to their 
home countries. Spain launched the 
largest such program in November 
2008, seeking to encourage unem-
ployed migrants’ departure by paying 
unemployment benefits in two lump 
sums—one given in Spain and the 
other delivered upon returning home. 
The Spanish government also paid for 
transportation back home. The pro-
gram bars participating migrants from 
returning to Spain for three years.14 
The U.K. and France adopted a 
similar program to encourage unau-
thorized migrants residing in camps in 
Calais, a French port on the English 
Channel, to return home.15 The Czech 
Republic and Japan have launched 
programs giving foreigners greater 
incentives to return home and impos-
ing restrictions on their reentry. 
Denmark, which has had a program 
operating for several years, has upped 
financial incentives for migrants to 
head back to their countries of origin.16
To date, the Spanish and Czech 
programs have attracted fewer par-
ticipants than was initially projected. 
For example, Spain estimated that 
more than 100,000 migrants would 
return home under its program, but 
it received only about 8,700 applica-
tions.17 This outcome shouldn’t be 
surprising. For most migrants, a life-
time income in Spain exceeds the 
two lump-sum benefit payments and 
value of the ticket home. Their home 
countries don’t typically offer much 
Table 1
Select Migration Policy Changes by Country
Policy Changes
Australia
Cut intake of skilled permanent migrants 14 percent for the 2009–10 fis-
cal year. Raised skilled migrants’ salary requirements. Redesigned critical 
skills list for permanent migrants to emphasize health, engineering and IT 
occupations while removing many others. Required new language tests for 
foreign workers in certain occupations.
Austria
In 2008, voted to keep restrictions on accession eight (A8) country workers 
from Eastern and Central Europe in place through 2011.
Belgium In 2008, voted to keep restrictions on A8 workers from Eastern and Central 
Europe in place through 2011.
Czech 
Republic
Implemented return program in February 2009. Government pays €500 and 
airfare home for foreign workers. About 2,000 migrants participated in the 
first phase of the program, which concluded in July 2009. Participants must 
give up Czech documents.
Denmark
In 2008, voted to keep restrictions on A8 workers from Eastern and Central 
Europe in place through 2011. In 2009, increased financial incentives for 
migrants to return home.
France
In July 2009, launched program to encourage illegal migrants in Calais to 
return home. Government pays plane fare and €2,000, plus resettlement as-
sistance. Program implemented jointly with the U.K. Also launched several 
high-profile immigration raids in 2009.
Germany
In 2008, voted to keep restrictions on A8 workers from Eastern and Central 
Europe in place through 2011.
Greece
Stepped up enforcement. Police bulldozed large migrant camp in Patras 
in 2009.
India In 2009, implemented new numerical quotas on hiring foreign workers.
Ireland
In 2009, stopped issuing new work permits to non-EU citizens for jobs with 
a salary under €30,000. Also stopped issuing work permits to household 
workers and truck drivers. Labor market tests extended; employers now 
must advertise for eight weeks within the EU before seeking non-EU work-
ers. Individuals renewing work permits now subject to labor market tests. 
New rules for dependents seeking jobs. Restricted illegal migrants’ access 
to public services.
Israel
Created task force in 2009 to crack down on illegal migrants. Stiffer penal-
ties for employers hiring illegal aliens put in place in 2010.
Italy
Suspended nonseasonal, non-EU worker entries in 2009 after lowering 
them and accepting applications only from 2008 backlogs. Limited 2008 
entries primarily to household workers. Issuance of most categories of 
residence permits to new immigrants now contingent on extent of integra-
tion, passing language tests. Income and eligibility requirements for family 
reunification strengthened in 2008. Unlawful presence criminalized in 2009. 
Approved unarmed citizen migration enforcement patrols. Access to public 
services blocked for illegal migrants.
Japan
Launched return program in April 2009 to encourage the departure of Latin 
Americans of Japanese descent. Pay for airfare plus a departure bonus. 
Reentry limited. About 11,000 approved as of October. 
Kazakhstan Imposed migration moratorium on less-skilled workers in 2009. Less-skilled-
worker quotas remain low for 2010. Labor market tests strengthened.
Malaysia
Stopped issuing work permits for most manufacturing and service jobs in 
2009. Permits for less-skilled foreign workers not renewed in 2009. Cut 
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employment or investment opportu-
nity. What’s more, after migrants have 
lived in a new country for a substantial 
period, they begin to integrate and are 
reluctant to leave. As a general rule, 
voluntary return programs aren’t very 
effective at getting settled migrants to 
depart.  
Recession’s Impact on Migration 
Under normal circumstances, 
immigration policy supports more 
immigration in good economic times 
and less in bad times. During the 
1990s high-tech boom, for instance, 
U.S. policy accommodated the rise in 
demand for IT workers. In 2000, the 
American Competitiveness in the 21st 
Century Act temporarily tripled the 
cap on H-1B visas and eased H-1B 
employment restrictions permanently. 
In hard times, labor protectionism 
has limited impact because migration 
naturally falls off. An extreme example 
was the Great Depression, when dete-
riorating economic conditions led to 
an 85 percent decline in the immigrant 
inflow between 1930 and 1932.18
During the Great Recession, ris-
ing unemployment rates across many 
advanced economies have deterred 
would-be migrants, leading to steep 
declines in flows along the major glob-
al migration corridors. The falloff in 
migration has been particularly notice-
able in those countries where a large 
proportion of foreign workers were 
employed in the hard-hit, business-
cycle-sensitive construction sector. 
Within the EU, where international 
labor migration is unrestricted, we can 
safely say that any declines have been 
due to market factors, not restrictions 
imposed by lawmakers. Immigrant 
inflows into Ireland from recent acces-
sion countries in Eastern and Central 
Europe—by far Ireland’s largest source 
of foreign labor—fell by 74 percent 
from 2007 to 2009.19 Irish social securi-
ty registrations (Personal Public Service 
numbers) from foreign nationals fell 63 
percent from 2007 to 2009, further evi-
dence of a drastic slowing of Ireland’s 
worker inflows.20 
Table 1




workers first. Higher levy on employers bringing in foreign workers was ap-
proved in 2010. New crackdown on illegal migrants launched in February 2010.
New 
Zealand
Reduced duration of permits for lower-skilled workers. Removed occupa-
tions from skill shortage lists in the 2008–09 fiscal year. Harder to get work 
permits renewed. 
Oman
Banned certain categories of foreign workers in 2008; some bans were lifted 
in 2009 and 2010; stepping up immigration enforcement; deporting thou-
sands of Asian migrants.
Portugal Cut 2009 immigration targets for non-EU workers by half.
Russia Reduced work permit quotas by half in 2009. Further cuts occurred in 2010. Em-
ployers seeking to hire foreign workers now face greater bureaucratic hurdles.
Saudi 
Arabia
Stopped issuing work permits to Bangladeshi workers in certain sectors in 2008.
Singapore
Implemented policy requiring employers to terminate foreign workers prior to 
native-born workers. Levies on employers of foreign workers increased in 2010.
South 
Korea
Reduced total foreign-worker permit quotas under the Employment Permit 
System from 100,000 to 34,000 in March 2009. Quotas reduced further to 
24,000 in 2010. Recruitment under this system also halted temporarily in 
early 2009. 
Spain
Restricted recruitment of guest workers via the “contingente” anonymous 
recruitment system in 2008–09. Curtailed exemptions from labor market test 
for “shortage” workers. Made it harder for individuals with residence permits 
to bring relatives to Spain. Program to encourage return of unemployed im-
migrants launched in November 2008: airfare paid, unemployment benefits 
paid in two lump-sum payments, migrant barred from returning to Spain for 
three years. About 8,700 approved as of November.
Switzerland
Cut work permit quotas by half in 2010 for non-EU citizens (although some 
additional allotments made in May 2010 to meet labor demand rise).
Taiwan
Cut permits for less-skilled workers in 2009. Limited foreign workers to a 
maximum of 20 percent of a manufacturer’s workforce, with exact limits 
varying by industry.
Thailand Stopped issuing new work permits in 2009. Curtailed renewals of work per-
mits. Stepped up immigration enforcement.
United 
Kingdom
Imposed stricter education and salary requirements on high-skilled non-EU 
guest workers (Tier 1). Raised minimum salaries for Tier 2 skilled workers. 
Suspended recruiting of less-skilled workers (Tier 3). Strengthened labor 
market test for skilled migrants (Tier 2). Employers must advertise for four 
weeks rather than two weeks. New law approved in July 2009 will extend 
foreigners’ required residency period in U.K. prior to earning citizenship, ef-
fective in 2011. Joined with France in 2009 to encourage illegal migrants in 
Calais, France, to return home: pays plane fare and €2,000 plus resettlement 
assistance. Higher fines instituted for employers of illegal migrants. New 
language tests for many foreign workers.
United 
States
Imposed tougher H-1B hiring rules on recipients of TARP funds. Required 
documented recruitment, higher wages and tougher safety standards for 
employers seeking foreign farmworkers under the H-2A program. New H-2A 
rules also allowed for longer referral periods for U.S. workers and created an 
electronic job registry. A number of states passed laws targeting unauthor-
ized immigrants, most notably Arizona and Oklahoma.
SOURCES: Return migration program statistics from the Migration Policy Institute (MPI), www.migrationinformation.
org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=749. Other information from Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; MPI; 
FRAGOMEN; University of California, Davis’ Migration News; and national immigration bureaus. For specific sources, see 
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rary, skilled-worker visas also fell in 
a number of other countries, such as  
Australia (Chart 2). 
Some signs of stabilization 
appeared in late 2009 as the world 
economy improved. For example, 
applications to Australia’s temporary 
Subclass 457 skilled visa program, 
similar to the H-1B program, and the 
U.K.’s Worker Registration Scheme 
increased over the second half of the 
year. More recent Australian data show 
that 2010 applications for Subclass 
457 visas are up significantly over last 
year’s levels.26
Undocumented migration 
falls. Illegal migration is highly cor-
related with the business cycle—often 
more so than legal migration. One 
reason is that workers dominate ille-
gal flows, while legal migration also 
includes family-based and humanitar-
ian migrants. 
Like legal workers, unauthorized 
migrants are better tolerated by author-
ities during economic expansions and 
subject to greater enforcement actions 
during downturns. History provides 
some examples, such as the 1953–54 
U.S. recession, which coincided with 
a major Border Patrol initiative that 
removed thousands of Mexicans.  
The recent recession brought 
with it broad-based declines in ille-
gal immigration. In Europe, the EU’s 
border agency, FRONTEX, estimates 
that undocumented migration fell 
33 percent in 2009 relative to 2008. 
Illegal sea landings in Spain, one of 
the most common entry points for 
would-be migrants, fell 46 percent 
from 2008 to 2009.27 Landings in Italy 
have also fallen significantly. Some of 
these declines can be attributed to the 
recession and some to the increased 
immigration enforcement in the 
Mediterranean Sea.
Along the U.S.–Mexico border, 
annual apprehensions of undocu-
mented migrants fell 33 percent from 
2007 to 2009 (Chart 3). Apprehensions 
in 2009 were down 55 percent from 
2005, when the housing boom was 
nearing its peak. According to the 
The recent recession 




The number of registered foreign 
workers in Spain fell in 2008, the last 
available year of data.21 Spain saw a 
two-thirds decline in the inflow of 
immigrants from Romania, its largest 
provider of foreign workers in recent 
years.22 Inflows into the U.K. from 
the A8 countries declined 21 percent 
in 2008.23 Applications for the U.K’s 
Worker Registration Scheme, which 
covers migrants from countries that 
joined the EU in 2004, fell 32 percent 
from 2008 to 2009.24 
Outside the EU, the decline 
in applications for work permits or 
employment-based visas suggests that 
fewer people sought work abroad dur-
ing the recession. In the U.S., appli-
cations for H-1B temporary skilled-
employment visas fell by 16.1 percent 
from 2008 to 2009.25 The H-1B cap 
of 65,000 for the 2010 fiscal year was 
not reached until December 2009, a 
drastic change over previous years, 
when quotas were filled within a few 
days of the opening for applications. 
And the H-1B cap for fiscal year 2011 
had not been reached as of June 11, 
2010. Applications for similar tempo-
Chart 2
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work permit quotas in some categories 
in May after slashing them by half in 
January. Malaysia has eased its strict 
migration policies somewhat, allowing 
some manufacturers to recruit foreign 
workers. It remains to be seen whether 
these and other countries can realign 
their labor and migration policies with 
their economies as the global economic 
recovery picks up speed.
Nicholson is a research analyst and Orrenius is 
a research officer and senior economist in the 
Research Department at the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Dallas.
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What Now?
Recent GDP data are increasingly 
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that the worst of the global reces-
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economies emerging from recession, 
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As the global economy recovers, 
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